Core Periphery Dichotomy in First Amendment Free Exercise Clause Doctrine Goldman v. Weinberger Bowen v. Roy and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz by Bloostein, Marc J.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 72
Issue 4 May 1987 Article 6
Core Periphery Dichotomy in First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause Doctrine Goldman v.
Weinberger Bowen v. Roy and O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz
Marc J. Bloostein
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marc J. Bloostein, Core Periphery Dichotomy in First Amendment Free Exercise Clause Doctrine Goldman v. Weinberger Bowen v. Roy and
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 827 (1987)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol72/iss4/6
THE "CORE"-"PERIPHERY" DICHOTOMY IN FIRST
AMENDMENT FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE DOCTRINE:
GOLDMAN v. WEINBERGER, BOWEN v. ROY, AND
O'LONE v. ESTATE OF SHABAZZ
In its October 1985 Term the Supreme Court introduced a ra-
tional basis standard of review into its first amendment free exercise
clause' jurisprudence. In Goldman v. Weinberger2 the Court ex-
amined a challenged military dress regulation with minimal scrutiny
and in Bowen v. Roy 3 three Justices agreed that courts should ex-
amine neutral restrictions on government benefits with minimal
scrutiny.4 This departure from the Court's traditional analysis of
free exercise restrictions5 continued in its October 1986 Term in
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 6 a case involving the rights of prison in-
mates to exercise freely their religion.
This Note describes the developing dichotomy of first amend-
ment free exercise doctrine using a sphere7 as a metaphor. In
Goldman and Roy the Court implicitly began separating contempo-
rary free exercise doctrine into two categories, which this Note la-
bels the "core" and the "periphery." Core cases arise in the context
1 "Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] ...."
U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The clause applies to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986); see infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text. See generally
Goldberg, The Free Exercise of Religion, 20 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1986); O'Neil, The Tenth
Charles L. Decker Lecture in Administrative and Civil Law: Civil Liberty and Military Necessity-
Some Preliminary Thoughts on Goldman v. Weinberger, 113 MIL. L. REV. 31 (1986); Note,
First Amendment Rights in the Military Context: What Deference is Due?-Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 85 (1986); Casenote, Constitutional Law-Free Exercise
Clause-Appropriate Military Officer May Prohibit the Wearing of Visible Religious Apparel in the
Interest of Uniformity, 23 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 135 (1987).
3 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986); see infra notes 92-114 and accompanying text. See generally
Note, Roy v. Cohen: Social Security Numbers and the Free Exercise Clause, 36 AM. U.L. REV.
217, 243-44 (1986) (brief postscript discusses Supreme Court's Roy opinion); Casenote,
supra note 2.
4 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2156. OnlyJustices Powell and Rehnquistjoined this segment
of Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion.
5 See infra notes 11-32 and accompanying text.
6 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
7 In terms of this metaphor, the core of traditional doctrine is located at the center
of the sphere. Travelling outward from the core, one crosses various layers of the pe-
riphery. Upon passing into the first layer, one crosses the border between compulsion
and choice, from discriminatory restrictions in the core to neutral restrictions on gov-
ernment benefits in the periphery. However, this first layer of the periphery is within the
context of ordinary social and political existence. As one continues outward, one
reaches another border: the interface between cases arising within the political commu-
nity and those arising in societies apart. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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of common social and political existence and involve government
compulsion rather than individual choice. 8 In contrast, cases in the
periphery arise either outside of the political community9 or involve
nondiscriminatory restrictions on government benefits.' 0 The
Court appears willing to abandon strict scrutiny in cases arising in
the periphery, although prior to Goldman and Roy the Court used
strict scrutiny to examine all free exercise claims.
This Note argues that the Court should abandon the develop-
ing dichotomy because courts must protect the freedom to act on
religious beliefs outside of the political community and protect indi-
viduals from government compulsion disguised as choice. The nas-
cent periphery doctrine effectively creates an irrebuttable
presumption of a compelling state regulatory interest, allowing
courts to avoid an in-depth factual inquiry into possible infringe-
ments of free exercise rights.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Contemporary Doctrine and the "Core" of Free Exercise
Modern free exercise clause jurisprudence originated in 1963
with Sherbert v. Verner. I' There the Court held that South Carolina's
8 Most free exercise claims arise in the political community. The political commu-
nity consists of daily social and political existence in which community, social, political,
and constitutional norms govern the relationship between sovereign and citizen. Sup-
pose, for example, an Orthodox Jewish minor objected to a state law requiring her to
attend school on Saturday, the day of her Sabbath. Her claim would fall into the core of
free exercise doctrine because it arises in the political community and the law compels
her to violate her beliefs. See infra notes 11-32 and accompanying text.
9 Two examples of settings beyond the political community are the military and
prisons. Claims arising in such separate societies fall into the periphery regardless of
whether they involve compulsion or choice. See infra notes 33-53 and accompanying
text.
10 Although these cases arise in the political community, they fall into the inner
periphery because the restrictions at issue involve some element of choice rather than
direct compulsion. Suppose, for example, a state law required welfare recipients to pick
up their checks in person, and to provide photographic identification upon receipt. Sup-
pose further that an individual's religious beliefs forbade him to possess a graven image
and he therefore had no form of photographic identification. Because this restriction is
facially neutral and governs receipt of a government benefit, it falls into the periphery.
See infra notes 54-73.
11 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court examined South Carolina's finding that a Sev-
enth Day Adventist failed to show "good cause" for refusing to work on Saturday even
though it was her Sabbath. Because Sherbert refused to accept Saturday work, the state
denied her request for statutory unemployment benefits. Id. at 401.
Prior to Sherbert, the Court struggled with the dichotomy between religious belief
and belief-motivated conduct, gradually developing restrictions on the government's
ability to burden religious conduct. See Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)
(licensing tax unconstitutional when levied on solicitors of religious contributions);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (solicitation licensing scheme invalid be-
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unemployment benefits program placed a substantial burden on the
free exercise of Sherbert's religion 12 and that the state could justify
such a burden only by showing a " 'compelling state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to
regulate.' ",s The Court explained that the state failed to demon-
strate such an interest 14 and, even if it had, it also would have had to
demonstrate that "no alternative forms of regulation would combat
such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights."' 15 Thus,
the Court adopted a strict scrutiny balancing approach to analyze
free exercise challenges. 16
The Court sharpened and refined the Sherbert test in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 17 finding a Wisconsin compulsory education law invalid as ap-
plied because the "law affirmatively compels [Amish parents], under
threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs."' 18 Because the statu-
tory scheme substantially inhibited free exercise, the Court required
the state to demonstrate an "interest of sufficient magnitude to
override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause."' 19 The Yoder Court then elaborated on the Sherbert compel-
cause officials had discretion in determining which groups were religious); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (Congress may regulate actions but may not
prohibit beliefs). However, the Court decided many of the pre-Sherbert cases on the
ground that the challenged state action also violated the plaintiffs' freedom of speech.
See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Jehovah's
Witness's religious objection to mandatory flag salute upheld primarily on freedom of
expression grounds). Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion),
marks the doctrinal transformation leading to Sherbert and its progeny. The Braunfeld
Court denied an OrthodoxJew's challenge to Sunday closing laws by reasoning that "if
the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power,... the statute is
valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its
purpose by means which do not impose such a burden." Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
12 The court viewed the scheme as compulsory because it forced Sherbert to
choose between herjob and her religious beliefs. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. Under South
Carolina law, a claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits if he or she failed to
accept available work without "good cause." See id. at 400 n.3.
13 Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). See generally
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 328-29 (1969) (analysis
of Sherbert standard of review).
14 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09. The Court found Braunfeld distinguishable because
in that case the state had a compelling interest and no less restrictive means of achieving
that interest. Id. at 408.
15 Id. at 407 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960)).
16 One commentator noted that "Sherbert introduced a new range of complexity
into the free exercise clause [because flor the first time the Court had affirmed a duty to
weigh the damage to an individual's freedom of conscience against the harm to the
state's legislative scheme." Clark, supra note 13, at 329.
17 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see Comment, The Education of the Amish Child, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1506 (1974) (noting that Yoder Court did not account for children's interests); Re-
cent Developments, 18 VILL. L. REv. 955 (1973).
18 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
19 Id. at 214.
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ling interest standard, stating that "only those interests of the high-
est order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion" 2 0-a right the Court deemed
fundamental.2 ' The Court concluded that the Amish parents' free
exercise rights outweighed the state's interest in compulsory educa-
tion beyond age fourteen. 22
In Thomas v. Review Board 23 the Court reaffirmed Sherbert by rul-
ing that exclusion from certain statutory benefits is tantamount to
compulsion. Thomas left his job after his employer transferred him
to a department engaged in the manufacture of tank turrets. 24 A
Jehovah's Witness, Thomas claimed that manufacturing war materi-
als violated principles of his religion.25 The Supreme Court found
that Thomas Was entitled to state unemployment benefits because
he terminated his employment for religious reasons,26 noting that
"religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment pro-
tection." 27 The majority upheld Thomas's challenge explaining,
"Here, as in Sherbert, the employee was put to a choice between fi-
delity to religious belief or cessation of work [and therefore] the co-
ercive impact on Thomas is indistinguishable from Sherbert."28 The
20 Id. at 215.
21 Id. at 214. The Yoder Court briefly discussed the significance of the religion
clauses:
Long before there was general acknowledgement of the need for univer-
sal formal education, the Religion Clauses had specifically and firmly
fixed the right to free exercise of religious beliefs, and buttressing this
fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition
against the establishment of any religion by government. The values un-
derlying these two provisions relating to religion have been zealously
protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly
high social importance.
Id.
22 Id. at 228-29. The mandatory education law reflected the "concern that children
under [age sixteen] not be employed under conditions hazardous to their health." Id. at
228. Because Amish children between ages fourteen and sixteen were employed on their
families' farms, the state's interest was partly achieved, despite non-compliance.
23 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See generally Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion
Clauses, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 193.
24 450 U.S. at 709.
25 Id. at 710.
26 Id. at 716. Under Illinois law a claimant was ineligible for unemployment bene-
fits if he or she voluntarily left his or her job without "good cause." See id. at 709 n.l.
27 Id. at 714. The Court explained, "Courts should not undertake to dissect reli-
gious beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his position or be-
cause his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more
sophisticated person might employ." Id. at 715; see Comment, Thomas v. Review Board
of Indiana Employment Security Division: Denying Freedom of Religion in Unemployment
Compensation Cases, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371, 387 (1979-1980) [hereinafter
Comment, Unemployment Compensation]; Comment, Constitutional Law: The Religion
Clauses-A Free Reign to Free Exercise?, 11 STETSON L. REV. 386, 393-97 (1982).
28 450 U.S. at 717. The Court viewed the regulation as compulsory even though
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Court applied a "compelling interest-least restrictive means" analy-
sis29 and found that the state failed to justify the burden placed
upon Thomas's religious freedom.30
The Supreme Court synthesized the Sherbert- Yoder- Thomas line
of cases in Bob Jones University v. United States 31 by holding that, de-
spite their religious beliefs, private religious schools that discrimi-
nate on the basis of race cannot maintain tax-exempt status. The
Court stated, "The governmental interest at stake here is compel-
ling [because] the Government has a fundamental, overriding inter-
est in eradicating racial discrimination [which] substantially
outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petition-
ers' exercise of their religious beliefs [and] no 'less restrictive
means' are available to achieve the government interest."3 2
B. Free Exercise in the "Periphery"
Two kinds of free exercise cases fall into the periphery: those
arising outside the political community and those involving neutral
restrictions on government benefits.33 Many lower courts evaluat-
ing cases arising outside the political community have applied a re-
laxed standard of review. In addition, a few courts have done so
when evaluating claims in neutral government benefits cases.
1. Beyond the Political Community
Courts frequently tolerate restrictions on free exercise in the
Thomas (like Sherbert before him) was not "forced" to quit his job. See infra notes 54-
73 and accompanying text.
29 One pre-Thomas, post-Yoder Note explained that a court examining a free exercise
claim will first consider the sincerity of the claimant's belief along with the degree to
which the challenged restriction hinders that belief. Note, Religious Exemptions under the
Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE LJ. 350, 355 (1980). How-
ever, one court recently argued that the "least restrictive means" inquiry is the most
critical aspect of the Sherbert-Yoder-Thomas free exercise analysis. Callahan v. Woods, 736
F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1984). This prong of the compelling interest test forces a
court "to measure the importance of a regulation by ascertaining the marginal benefit of
applying it to all individuals, rather than to all individuals except those holding a con-
flicting religious conviction." Id.
Since Thomas, the Court no longer inquires into the sincerity of the claimant's belief,
see supra note 27 and accompanying text; consequently, the balancing analysis weighs the
harm to the believer's practice against the state's interest in restricting the practice. See
infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; see also infra note 173.
30 450 U.S. at 719. The Review Board gave two reasons for the disqualifying provi-
sion of the Indiana unemployment scheme: to avoid widespread unemployment if peo-
ple were permitted to leave their jobs for personal reasons and to avoid detailed probing
by employers into job applicants' religious beliefs. Id. at 718-19; see Comment, Unem-
ployment Compensation, supra note 27, at 398-402.
3i 461 U.S. 574 (1983). See generally Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy:
Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 20-30.
32 461 U.S. at 604 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
33 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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military, in police forces, and in prisons. 34 Traditionally, courts hesi-
tate to review any self-regulation by these bodies, each of which
must exert virtually unquestioned authority to control its ranks and
thereby serve its important societal function.35 Although these bod-
ies often have compelling interests in regulating their members,
courts tend simply to defer to the judgment of those who control
the organizations rather than account for these compelling interests
in a strict scrutiny analysis of a challenged action.36
Courts generally treat free exercise claims arising in the armed
services with lessened scrutiny because the military has a tremen-
dous interest in maintaining quasi-autonomy, uniformity, discipline,
and esprit de corps. For example, in Goldman v. Secretary of Defense 37
the D.C. Circuit rejected the free exercise claim of an OrthodoxJew-
ish Air Force psychologist whose commanding officer, pursuant to
Air Force dress regulations, ordered him not to wear his yarmulke
while in uniform. The court refused to employ strict scrutiny in this
context, explaining that "we must simply judge whether the restric-
tions on Goldman's right to exercise his religion were authorized
and justified by the power of the military to regulate itself, giving
due weight to each of the conflicting interests." 38
Many courts hearing free exercise claims against the military
have applied a standard of review falling short of the "compelling
government interest-least restrictive means" standard of Sherbert
and its progeny.3 9 Moreover, some courts have refused to review
the merits of free exercise claims against the military altogether.40
34 See Note, Goldman v. Secretary of Defense: Restricting the Religious Rights of Mili-
tary Servicemembers, 34 Am. U.L. REv. 881, 889-96 (1985) (surveying free exercise in con-
texts outside political community).
35 See, e.g., Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1535-36 nn.5-6 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (explaining military interest in self-regulation), aff'd sub nom. Goldman v.
Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
36 See infra notes 37-43 & 49-53 and accompanying text.
37 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct.
1310 (1986); see infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text for a comprehensive discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's decision. See generally Note, supra note 34; Note, Constitu-
tional Law-The Clash Between the Free Exercise of Religion and the Military's Uniform
Regulations-Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 195 (1985).
38 734 F.2d at 1536.
39 See, e.g., Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168, 1178-81 (7th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing D.C. Circuit's Goldman v. Secretary standard); Kalinsky v. Secretary of Defense, No.
78-17, slip op. at 16-18 (D.D.C. June 25, 1979) (modified rational basis test), quoted in
Folk, Military Appearance Requirements and Free Exercise of Religion, 98 MIL. L. REv. 53, 84-85
(1982). But see Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (apply-
ing strict scrutiny analysis), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); Bitterman v. Secretary of
Defense, 553 F. Supp. 719, 726 (D.D.C. 1982) (dress regulations least restrictive means
to accommodate Air Force's substantial interests).
40 Under the limited reviewability doctrine of Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197,
201-02 (5th Cir. 1971), a court must weigh the constitutional claim against the possible
extent of interference with military functions and expertise to determine whether it can
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The Supreme Court "has long recognized that the military is, by
necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society." 4 1
Consequently, "'the rights of men in the armed forces must per-
force be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of disci-
pline and duty.' "42 Courts have concluded that precedent involving
the military and fundamental constitutional rights such as freedom
of speech and assembly mandates deferential treatment of military
free exercise cases. 43
Many of the same concerns that have prompted courts to re-
strict fundamental rights in the military arise in cases involving po-
lice forces. For example, in Cupit v. Baton Rouge Police Department,44 a
Louisiana state court required that police grooming regulations
bear only a rational relation to a legitimate state interest when they
infringe upon free exercise rights.45 A federal district court facing
much the same issue adopted an intermediate approach in Marshall
v. District of Columbia. 46 That court balanced the plaintiff's free exer-
cise right against the state's interests, specifically rejecting a rational
relation test,4 7 although not requiring the state to demonstrate a
compelling interest.48
Prisons are the ultimate paradigm of a society beyond the polit-
ical community. Courts have applied a variety of tests to determine
review the claim. See Khalsa v. Weinberger, 787 F.2d 1288, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1986)
(amended order in light of Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986), affirming
previous decision not to review free exercise challenge to Army appearance regula-
tions); NoteJudicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
387 (1984).
41 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
42 Id. at 744 (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opin-
ion)); see Everett, Military Justice in the Wake of Parker v. Levy, 67 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1975);
Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional
Rights, 62 N.C.L. REV. 177 (1984); Peck, The Justices and the Generals: the Supreme Court and
Judicial Review of Military Activities, 70 MIL. L. REV. I (1975); Warren, The Bill of Rights and
the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181 (1962); Zillman & Imwinkelried, Constitutional Rights
and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 397 (1976);
Comment, Free Speech and the Armed Forces: The Case Against Judicial Deference, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1102 (1978).
43 See, e.g., Ogden v. United States, 758 F.2d 1168, 1178-81 (7th Cir. 1985); see also
Folk, supra note 39; Folk, Religion and the Military: Recent Developments, ARMY LAw., Dec.
1985, at 6; Foreman, Religion, Conscience and Military Discipline, 52 MIL. L. REV. 77 (1971).
44 277 So. 2d 454, 456 (La. Ct. App.), writ refused, 281 So. 2d 745 (La. 1973).
45 Shortly after joining the Baton Rouge Police Department, the plaintiffs joined a
religious group that forbade them to shave. Charged with violating the Department's
regulations requiring that they shave regularly, the plaintiffs lost their jobs. The court
provided neither precedent nor rationale for adopting a rational relation standard.
46 392 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 559 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
47 Id. at 1016 n.5.
48 Id. at 1013-14. The court upheld the regulation, reasoning that "appearance
regulations promote [a state] interest which, in light of the facts of this case, outweigh
[sic) the plaintiff's interest in maintaining his hair and beard as his religious beliefs dic-
tate." Id. at 1015.
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whether prison authorities have violated inmates' free exercise
rights.49 The tests, ranging from a mere reasonableness inquiry to a
compelling interest analysis, give varying weight to the unique con-
cerns of prison officials. In another prison civil liberties context, the
Supreme Court held that "when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reason-
ably related to legitimate penological interests." 50
Many courts have deferred to officials'judgment in determining
whether restrictions on prisoners' free exercise rights are necessary
to secure prison order. In St. Claire v. Cuyler, 51 for example, the
court required that prison officials merely "produce evidence [dem-
onstrating] that to permit the exercise of first amendment rights
would create a potential danger to institutional security."5 2 The
court held that the warden's restrictions on St. Claire's religious lib-
erty were "reasonably related to [that] legitimate correctional
49 As one commentator on the topic of free exercise rights in prison noted,
Seven distinct tests can be identified in the cases and the law review
literature: 1) the clear and present danger test; 2) the substantial interfer-
ence test; 3) the Procunier v. Martinez [416 U.S. 396 (1974)] test; 4) the
reasonableness test; 5) the ad hoc balancing test; 6) the Braunfeld v. Brown
[366 U.S. 599 (1961)] test; and 7) the compelling interest test.
Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 812, 837-38 (1977)
(footnotes omitted); see Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 933-34 (4th Cir. 1986) (rea-
sonableness test); Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416,420 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (modi-
fied compelling interest test), rev'd sub nom. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400
(1987); Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1975) (Procunier v. Martinez test,
which requires an important or substantial government interest); Moore v. Ciccone, 459
F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (ad hoc balancing test); see also Udey v. Kastner,
805 F.2d 1218, 1219 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) ("We pray the Supreme Court in
Shabazz v. OLone will bring order to this unholy mess.").
50 Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987) (challenge to prison mail and
marriage regulations). The Turner Court enumerated four factors relevant to determin-
ing the reasonableness of prison regulations: (1) whether the regulation bears a rational
relation to the asserted penological goal; (2) whether there exist alternative means of
exercising the restricted right; (3) the impact accommodation of the asserted right will
have on guards and other inmates; and (4) whether there exist ready alternatives to the
regulation. Id. at 2262.
51 634 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980). St. Claire, a Muslim affiliated with the Ahmadiyya
branch of Islam, alleged three violations of his right to free exercise: (1) a guard ordered
him to remove his kufi, a religious head covering, while in the dining room; (2) a guard
ordered him to remove a turban made from a bedsheet before passing through a secur-
ity gate; and (3) the prison warden prohibited him from attending religious services
while he was segregated from other prisoners. 634 F.2d at 111-12. The Third Circuit in
Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987) severely modified St. Claire. See infra notes
115-34 and accompanying text.
52 634 F.2d at 114. The defendants' testimony at trial provided several reasons for
limiting prisoners' free exercise rights. They first noted that hats could conceal contra-
band, such as small weapons, small tools, or drugs. Id. at 115. Second, some inmates
wore head coverings for identification purposes. Id. Third, the defendants indicated
that escortirfg prisoners to religious services was not feasible because of a shortage of
guards. Id. at 116.
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goal." 53
2. Neutral Restrictions on Government Benefits
The periphery also includes neutral restrictions on government
benefits. 54 In cases involving nondiscriminatory restrictions, the
government has argued that because it has a great interest in uni-
formly enforcing regulations regarding benefit programs and be-
cause people can avoid such regulations by simply foregoing the
benefits, courts should examine free exercise challenges to such re-
strictions with only minimal scrutiny.55 In fact, courts have treated
benefit program regulations with varying degrees of deference,
although most employ the traditional strict-scrutiny standard.56
One court of appeals relaxed the level of scrutiny it applied in a
benefit restriction case by presumptively declaring the burden on
religion minimal and the government interest significant. In Alexan-
der v. Trustees of Boston University 57 the First Circuit rejected the free
exercise claims of theology students who were denied federal finan-
cial assistance because they refused to sign a statutorily required58
statement of selective service registration compliance. The court
explained that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because the burden
on free exercise was remote and tangential. 59 The court acknowl-
edged that denial of aid "arguably may constitute some slight bur-
den on the plaintiffs' first amendment rights." 60 The appeals court
reasoned, however, that "[i]f administrative convenience must give
way on this occasion, [the court] would fear the erosion of the gov-
ernment's essential right to obtain from its citizens, without endless
litigation and hassle, the basic information needed to govern." 6'
In United States v. Lee62 an Amish farmer refused to withhold
social security tax from his employees' pay and to pay his portion of
the tax because he opposed the national social security system on
religious grounds. 63 The Court applied strict scrutiny and con-
53 Id. at 117.
54 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
56 This Note argues that Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Thomas v. Re-
view Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983), are indistinguishable from cases involving benefit restrictions that some legal
thinkers argue should receive different judicial treatment.
57 766 F.2d 630 (1st Cir. 1985).
58 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 462(0(2) (West Supp. 1987).
59 766 F.2d at 643. The students objected on religious grounds to the selective
service system itself rather than to the act of giving the school information required by
the compliance statement. Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 644-45.
62 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
63 Id. at 254-55. The Court cited Thomas and Yoder for the proposition that "[t]he
1987] 835
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
cluded, "Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound
tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the
payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax." 64 Although
the Court characterized Lee's actions leading to tax liability as vol-
untary rather than compulsory, 65 it subjected the government's reg-
ulation to a strict scrutiny analysis.
Justice Stevens, concurring, argued that one who seeks a relig-
ious-based exemption from a neutral regulation should have to
prove that there is a unique reason for a court to grant it.66 He
proposed a rational basis analysis under which courts would pre-
sume that a state's interests are legitimate and the claimant would
have to demonstrate otherwise. 67 Stevens distinguished Sherbert and
Thomas because "laws intended to provide a benefit to a limited class
of otherwise disadvantaged persons should be judged by a different
standard than that appropriate for the enforcement of neutral laws
of general applicability."-68
Dean Ely has argued that courts should permit religious-based
exemptions from neutral restrictions on government benefits only
when they can discern a discriminatory intent from the challenged
legislation or regulation. 69 Ely explained that "judicial intervention
[in free exercise claims] is indicated only when there is proof that
the [regulation at issue] resulted from a desire comparatively to
favor or disfavor a religion or religion generally." 70 Ely's approach
is a greater departure from traditional free exercise doctrine than is
Justice Stevens's concurrence in Lee. 71 Even if a claimant proves
discriminatory intent, Ely's scheme would require a court to deter-
mine only whether the regulation "relate[s] rationally to an accepta-
ble goal. 7 2
In sum, a growing number of legal thinkers regard neutral re-
strictions on benefits as posing an insubstantial threat to free exer-
cise. Consequently, some judges distinguish between compulsory
state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accom-
plish an overriding governmental interest." Id. at 257-58. The Court then noted that
the "Government's interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and
contribution to the social security system is very high," id. at 258-59 (emphasis added),
and it turned to the question of whether accommodation of Lee's belief would "unduly
interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest." Id.
64 Id. at 260.
65 Id. at 254-55.
66 Id. at 262, 264 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 262.
68 Id. at 264 n.3.
69 Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205,
1315-16 (1970).
70 Id. at 1314 (footnote omitted).
71 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
72 Ely, supra note 69, at 1314.
[Vol. 72:827
1987] FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 837
regulations, which lie within the core of free exercise doctrine, and
neutral regulations, which lie in the periphery. These jurists have
carefully examined those regulations within the core and have
largely deferred to regulations occupying the periphery.73
II
THE CASES
The deferential treatment that some judges have given restric-
tions on religious liberty in the periphery recently surfaced in three
Supreme Court opinions. In Goldman v. Weinberger74 the Court em-
braced a rational basis analysis for military regulations. Bowen v.
Roy 75 produced a minority opinion advocating similar treatment for
cases involving neutral restrictions on benefits. In Shabazz v. Estate of
O'Lone 76 the Court applied minimal scrutiny to prisoners' free exer-
cise claims.
A. Goldman v. Weinberger
1. The Facts and the Decisions Below
S. Simcha Goldman, an OrthodoxJew, wore his yarmulke every
day while in the Air Force; his service cap concealed it while he was
outdoors. 77 In April 1981 Goldman wore his yarmulke while testify-
ing as a defense witness at a court-martial proceeding. The prose-
cuting counsel filed a complaint with Goldman's commander
charging that Goldman violated an Air Force regulation by wearing
his skullcap while in uniform.78  The commander informed
Goldman of the violation and ordered him not to wear his yarmulke
on the base while outside of the hospital. In June 1981 Goldman
73 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit applied a strict scrutiny analysis to a challenged
neutral regulation in Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'dmem., 105
S. Ct. 3492 (1985) (equally divided Court). Citing religious beliefs, the plaintiff refused
to comply with Nebraska's requirement that her photograph appear on her driver's li-
cense. Id at 1122-23. The court of appeals noted that the burden on Quaring was
indistinguishable from that placed on the plaintiff in Sherbert, for "Nebraska's photo-
graph requirement puts Quaring to the choice of following an important precept of her
religion or foregoing the important privilege of driving a car." Id. at 1125. The court
applied a strict scrutiny analysis and held that the state failed to show that its regulation
was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. Id. at 1126. See
also Dennis v. Charnes, 571 F. Supp. 462, 464 (D. Colo. 1983) (state has compelling
interest in requiring photographs on driver's licenses); Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div.,
197 Colo. 455, 593 P.2d 1363, 1366 (en banc) (compelling state interest), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885 (1979). But see Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House, 269 Ind.
361, 380 N.E.2d 1225 (1978) (no compelling state interest).
74 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
75 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
76 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
77 Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312.
78 Id. Air Force Regulation 35-10 provides in relevant part:
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
received the commander's written order that he refrain from wear-
ing his yarmulke anywhere on the base. Moreover, the commander
withdrew his recommendation that Goldman be permitted to extend
his term of active duty.79
Goldman sought and obtained injunctive relief against enforce-
ment of the regulation on the ground that it violated his right to free
exercise.80 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit framed the question as
whether the restrictions on Goldman's right to free exercise were
"justified by the power of the military to regulate itself, giving due
weight to each of the conflicting interests." 8' However, the court
explained, "This inquiry does not require a 'balancing' of the indi-
vidual and military interests on each side, but rather a determination
whether legitimate military ends are sought to be achieved by means
designed to accommodate the individual right to an appropriate de-
gree."8 2 The court found that the Air Force has a unique interest in
uniformity because it must enforce its rules "not for the sake of the
regulations, but for the sake of enforcement."8 3
2. The Supreme Court Opinions
The Supreme Court affirmed, but employed a different analysis
than the D.C. Circuit. The Court noted that "to accomplish its mis-
sion the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commit-
ment, and esprit de corps." '8 4 It found that when deciding whether
military needs justify a particular restriction on free exercise, courts
must "give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular mili-
tary interest."8 5 The Court rejected Goldman's claim that the mili-
tary's dress code impinged on his right to free exercise, finding
Wear of Headgear:
(1) Air Force personnel in uniform will wear proper headgear when
outdoors ....
(2) Headgear will not be worn:
(f) While indoors except by armed security police in the perform-
ance of their duties.
A.F.R. 35-10, quoted in Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1533-34 n.1.
79 Goldman v. Secretary, 734 F.2d at 1533.
80 Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 530 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1981) (preliminary
injunction), rev'd, 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Goldman v. Weinberger,
106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
81 Goldman v. Secretary, 734 F.2d at 1536; see 734 F.2d at 1535 (district court entered
permanent injunction).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1540.
84 Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313.
85 Id.
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instead that the challenged regulation "reasonably and evenhand-
edly regulate[s] dress in the interest of the military's perceived need
for uniformity."'8 6 The majority did not require that any scientific
findings serve as a basis for the Air Force regulations; the only con-
stitutionally required basis was the reasonable exercise of profes-
sional judgment.8 7 The Court cited several cases arising in military
contexts to support its standard of review, but no cited case in-
volved a free exercise clause claim.88
In dissent, Justice Brennan charged that the majority chose "a
subrational-basis standard-absolute uncritical 'deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities.' "89 Justice O'Connor
also dissented, asserting that the majority rejected Goldman's claim
"without even the slightest attempt to weigh his asserted right to the
free exercise of his religion against the interest of the Air Force in
uniformity of dress within the military hospital." 90Justice O'Connor
asserted that the majority neither articulated nor applied a clear test
for free exercise claims in the military context.91
B. Bowen v. Roy
1. The Facts and the Decision Below
Stephen Roy, a Native American, believed that the spirit and
person of his daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, had to remain
unique and therefore could not be numerically identified.92 Roy
and his wife applied for aid to families with dependent children and
food stamp program benefits, but refused to comply with the statu-
tory requirement 93 that they supply their dependents' social security
numbers. Roy and his wife filed suit in federal district court assert-
86 Id. at 1314.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1312-13. The Court cited Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983)
(criminal rights); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (sex discrimination);
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-55 (1980) (freedom of expression case holding that
"the Air Force regulations [at issue] restrict speech no more than is reasonably neces-
sary to protect the substantial government interest"); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U.S. 738, 757 (1975) (criminal rights); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (due
process and freedom of expression); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (re-
fusal to take loyalty oath).
89 Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1317 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion,
106 S. Ct. at 1313).
90 Id. at 1324 (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
91 Id.
92 Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2150 n.3 (1986). Roy referred to the social se-
curity number as part of a "great evil," Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600, 603 (M.D. Pa.
1984), vacated sub nom. Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986), which would "serve to rob
the spirit of Little Bird of the Snow and prevent her from preparing for greater spiritual
power." Appellee's Brief at 3, Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986) (No. 84-780).
93 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1982).
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ing that the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) re-
fusal to provide benefits to their daughter for failing to supply a
social security number violated their free exercise rights9 4 and
sought an order that the DPW pay them the benefits.95
The district court refused to apply strict scrutiny; instead, it ap-
plied a modified test, allowing the plaintiffs to prevail if "some rea-
sonable alternative means which would not burden the Plaintiffs' first
amendment rights" 96 could serve the government's interests in us-
ing social security numbers. The court concluded that although the
government's general interest was great, its interest in this particu-
lar case was small and it therefore granted the Roys an exemption
from the social security number requirement. 97 The court enjoined
both the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
DPW from denying benefits to the Roy girl and enjoined HHS from
using or disseminating her social security number until her six-
teenth birthday.98
94 Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. at 603.
95 Id. at 613-14. During trial the government discovered that it had already issued a
social security number to the girl and Roy modified his request for relief by asking that
the district court prevent state and federal agencies from using the social security
number. Id. at 609. The case was not moot, however, because the court found that
"Roy believes that the establishment of a social security number for Little Bird of the
Snow, without more, has not 'robbed her spirit,' but widespread use of the social secur-
ity number by the federal or state governments in their computer systems would have
that effect." Id. at 605.
96 Id. at 611 (emphasis in original). The court explained:
In other words, if holding that the Plaintiffs' objection to the social secur-
ity number requirement entitles them to an exemption from the require-
ment would substantially burden the benefit programs involved in this
case by, for example, involving a cost so great that the efficient operation
of the programs would be effected or by creating a substantial likelihood
of chaos in the system resulting from a proliferation of claims to exemp-
tions from the requirement then the governments' interest should be
held superior to the Plaintiffs' right to exercise their religious beliefs.
Id.; see Note, Roy v. Cohen: Social Security Numbers and the Free Exercise Clause, 36 AM. U.L.
REV. 217, 233-35 (1986) (discussing of district court's "reasonable less restrictive alter-
native" test).
97 The Roy district court noted that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the
government encountered any administrative problems after Stevens v. Berger, 428 F.
Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), a case in which a district court allowed a religious-based
exemption to the social security number requirement. Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. at 612.
In Stevens, the plaintiffs believed that use of their social security numbers was "a device
of the Antichrist, and.., they feared [their] children, if numbered in this way, might be
barred from entering heaven." Stevens, 428 F. Supp. at 897. The Stevens court granted
the plaintiffs injunctive relief, finding that "the deleterious effects of their actions on the
welfare system is minuscule." Id. at 908.
98 Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. at 614.
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2. The Supreme Court Holding
On direct appeal, 99 the Supreme Court reversed the district
court. The Court divided the case into two issues: (1) whether Con-
gress could require that every applicant for aid furnish his or her
social security number; and (2) whether Congress could require that
state agencies utilize such numbers.100 The Justices agreed only on
the second issue, 10 1 concluding that the government could require
the use of the plaintiff's social security number, which the govern-
ment already possessed, in administering its benefit program. The
Court explained, "The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be un-
derstood to require the Government to conduct its own internal af-
fairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens."10 2 It concluded that the State's use of a social security
number simply did not impair Roy's ability to exercise his religious
beliefs and, consequently, that no balancing was necessary. 103 The
Court therefore vacated the district court's order enjoining HHS
from making use of Little Bird of the Snow's social security
number.10 4
3. The Roy Minority's Reasonableness Analysis
In Part III of the Court's opinion, Chief Justice Burger, joined
only by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, faced the issue of whether a
statute constitutionally could require that the Roy's provide their
daughter's social security number to a state welfare agency.10 5
Chief Justice Burger wrote that courts should examine neutral re-
strictions 10 6 on government benefits affecting religious liberty with
minimal scrutiny, stating that "the Government meets its burden
99 HHS appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C, § 1252 (1982)
("Direct appeals from decisions invalidating Acts of Congress").
100 Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2151-52 (1986).
101 One Justice opined that the court's disposition of the second issue mooted the
first because the DPW already possessed a social security number for Little Bird of the
Snow, see supra note 95, and she would not have to furnish one to receive benefits. Roy,
106 S. Ct. at 2162-63 (Stevens,J, concurring in part and concurring in the result). Five
Justices resolved the first issue in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 2160 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part); id at 2165-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan); id at 2169 (White, J., dissenting). Three
Justices resolved the first issue in favor of the government. Id. at 2153-58; see infra notes
105-114 and accompanying text.
102 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2152.
103 Id. at 2152 n.6. The Court remarked, "Roy may no more prevail on his religious
objection to the Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he
could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Government's filing
cabinets." Id. at 2152.
104 Id. at 2158.
105 ChiefJustice Burger contended that the issue was ripe for decision and was not
moot. Id. at 2153 n.7.
106 The Chief Justice found that "in no sense does [the challenged regulation] af-
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when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement.., is a reason-
able means of promoting a legitimate public interest."' 0 7 The Chief
Justice concluded that the social security number requirement easily
passes muster under this test. t08
Chief Justice Burger rejected the compelling interest standard
used in Sherbert and its progeny as inappropriate in this case. 10 9 He
explained that "government regulation that indirectly and inciden-
tally calls for a choice between securing a governmental benefit and
adherence to religious beliefs is wholly different from governmental
action or legislation that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or
inescapably compels conduct that some find objectionable for relig-
ious reasons." 110 Chief Justice Burger also distinguished Sherbert
and Thomas because the challenged statutes in those cases required
firmatively compel appellees, by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously moti-
vated conduct." Id. at 2154.
107 Id. at 2156. In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046
(1987), a six member majority of the Supreme Court rejected the Roy minority argument
in a case that it found indistinguishable from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), see
supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text, and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981), see supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text. Hobbie, a Seventh Day Adventist,
lost herjob after she refused to work on her Sabbath. Hobbie, 107 S. Ct. at 1047-48. Her
employer charged her with misconduct related to work, and consequently the state de-
nied her benefits request. Id. at 1048. A Florida appeals court upheld the state's find-
ing. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 475 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (no opinion; no appeal possible under Florida law), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1986).
Under Florida law, an employee discharged for work-related misconduct cannot qualify
for benefits. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.101(b) (West 1981). Applying Sherbert and Thomas,
the Hobbie Court held that the plaintiff's religious conversion after she began work "is
immaterial to our determination that her free exercise rights have been burdened; the
salient inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause is the burden involved." 107 S. Ct. at
1051.
Although the neutral benefits issue was not squarely before the Hobbie Court,Justice
Brennan's majority opinion emphasized that only three Justices supported Part III of
ChiefJustice Burger's Roy opinion. Id. at 1049, 1050 n.7. Justice Stevens did not join
the Roy minority opinion because he thought that the issue was not properly before the
Court. Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2161 (Stevens, J., concurring). Moreover, Stevens endorsed
the Roy minority's general approach in his separate opinion in United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982). See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. In Hobbie, Stevens wrote
a separate opinion arguing that Sherbert and Thomas controlled the case because the Un-
employment Appeals Commission's finding resulted in unequal treatment. 107 S. Ct. at
1053 (Stevens, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Powell concurred in Hobbie on the
ground that the majority should have simply distinguished the Roy Part III opinion
rather than explicitly reject it. Id. at 1052 (Powell, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehn-
quist dissented. Id. at 1052 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Although ChiefJustice Burger
has left the Court, three remaining Justices apparently support his Roy Part III opinion.
Justice Scalia, who joined the Court after it decided Roy, sided with the majority in re-
jecting ChiefJustice Burger's approach.
108 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2158.
109 Id at 2156. Burger relied in part on Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
293 U.S. 245 (1934) (conscientious objector case decided prior to Court's incorporation
of free exercise clause into fourteenth amendment). Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2154.
11o Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2155.
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applicants to show "good cause" for quitting ajob or refusing avail-
able work, and "to consider a religiously motivated resignation to
be 'without good cause' tends to exhibit hostility, not neutrality, to-
wards religion." 11 '
A majority of the Court refused to endorse Burger's analysis. 1 2
For example, Justice O'Connor explained in her separate opinion,
"Such a test has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First
Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the
Equal Protection Clause already provides.""13 Instead, Justice
O'Connor "would apply [the Court's] long line of precedents to
hold that the Government must accommodate a legitimate free ex-
ercise claim unless pursuing an especially important interest by nar-
rowly tailored means."1 14
C. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz
1. The Facts and the Decisions Below
Plaintiffs Shabazz and Mateen, inmates at the New Jersey State
Prison at Leesburg, were practicing Muslims. 115 In an effort to re-
duce overcrowding, prison authorities promulgated regulations re-
quiring some prisoners to work outside of the prison. Under these
regulations, once a prisoner left the compound in the morning, he
could not return until the end of the day. 116 Plaintiffs objected to
the rules because they prevented them from returning to the prison
on Friday afternoons to attend Jumu'ah, their religion's central
service. 117
Plaintiffs filed a federal civil rights action seeking injunctive re-
lief. The district court, applying the deferential standard set forth
by the Third Circuit in St. Claire v. Cuyler, 118 stated that "all officials
must do [to justify an infringement upon free exercise rights] is
show a potential danger to security."' 19 Because "no less restrictive
alternative could be adopted without potentially compromising a le-
gitimate institutional objective,"' 120 the district court refused to
111 Id. at 2156.
112 See supra note 101.
113 Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2166 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114 Id.
115 Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 417 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
116 Id. at418.
117 Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J. 1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 416
(3d Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400
(1987). According to the plaintiffs, this service could only take place during certain
hours on Friday afternoons. Id.
1 Is 634 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980); see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
119 Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. at 933 (emphasis in original).
120 Id. at 934.
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grant injunctive relief. On appeal to the Third Circuit, a three judge
panel affirmed the district court's decision based upon its applica-
tion of the St. Claire standard.121 The Third Circuit then agreed to
rehear the case en banc. 122
Upon rehearing, the appeals court modified the St. Claire stan-
dard. The court noted that attendance at the prayer service was
central to the Muslim prisoners' free exercise rights 123 and held that
to sustain the regulations prison authorities "must show [upon re-
mand] that [they] were intended to serve, and do serve, the impor-
tant penological goal of security, and that no reasonable method
exists by which appellants' religious rights can be accommodated
without creating bona fide security problems."' 124 Thus, the court
refused to defer to the professional judgment of prison officials;
rather, it embraced a standard similar to traditional strict scrutiny of
regulations impinging on free exercise. 125
2. The Supreme Court Opinions
The Supreme Court reversed. Relying on Turner v. Safley, 126
the Court held that the challenged prison regulations were "reason-
ably related to legitimate penological objectives."' 127 The Court
noted that the Third Circuit incorrectly placed a burden on prison
officials to show that there existed no reasonable method to accom-
modate prisoners' religious needs. 128 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained, "While we in no way minimize the cen-
tral importance ofJumu'ah to respondents, we are unwilling to hold
that prison officials are required by the Constitution to sacrifice le-
gitimate penological objectives to that end."'129 Because the regula-
tions did not prohibit prisoners from participating in other Muslim
religious ceremonies, the Court found them constitutional.13 0
Rehnquist explained that "this ability on the part of respondents to
participate in other religious observances of their faith supports the
conclusion that the restrictions at issue here were reasonable."' 3'
121 See Shabazz, 782 F.2d at 417.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 420.
124 Id.
125 The Third Circuit thus moved away from the deferential stance adopted by the
Supreme Court in Goldman in the context of the military. See supra text accompanying
notes 84-88. The dissent argued that under the majority standard "federal courts are no
longer guardians of fundamental constitutional rights but arbitrators in disputes be-
tween prison officials and inmates." Shabazz, 782 F.2d at 423 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
126 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987); see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
127 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (1987).
128 Id. at 2405.
129 Id. at 2406.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens, argued that because attendance at the Jumu'ah
ceremony is not presumptively dangerous, prison officials should
have to demonstrate that their restrictions "are necessary to further
an important government interest, and that these restrictions are no
greater than necessary to achieve prison objectives." 13 2 Justice
Brennan discounted the importance of the implicit core-periphery
dichotomy:
It is ... easy to think of prisoners as members of a separate
netherworld, driven by its own demands, ordered by its own cus-
toms, ruled by those whose claim to power rests on raw necessity.
Nothing can change the fact, however, that the society that these
prisoners inhabit is our own. Prisons may exist on the margins of
that society, but no act of will can sever them from the body poli-
tic. When prisoners emerge from the shadows to press a constitu-
tional claim, they invoke no alien set of principles drawn from a
distant culture. Rather, they speak the language of the charter
upon which all of us rely to hold official power accountable. They
ask us to acknowledge that power exercised in the shadows must
be restrained at least as diligently as power that acts in the
sunlight. 133
Brennan attacked the Court's application of the Turner standard on
the ground that theJumu'ah set-vice is not a fungible religious prac-
tice and thus the prisoners have no alternative means of exercising
their religious rights.' 34
III
ANALYSIS
The Goldman Court and the three Justices joining in Part III of
the Court's opinion in Roy applied minimal scrutiny to regulations
challenged as violating the free exercise clause. These cases indicate
that a new branch of free exercise doctrine is emerging. This nas-
cent mode of analysis separates the "periphery"' 135 from the doctri-
nal "core."' 3 6 This dichotomy is unnecessary and pernicious.
Courts should abandon it and examine all free exercise claims with
strict scrutiny.
132 Id. at 2407 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2408.
134 Id. at 2410-11.
135 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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A. The Illegitimate Origins of the "Core"-"Periphery"
Dichotomy
Goldman, Shabazz, and Part III of Roy indicate the Supreme
Court's willingness to distinguish between free exercise claims mer-
iting strict scrutiny and those meriting only minimal judicial review.
The Goldman and Shabazz Courts and the Roy minority defined an
extremely deferential reasonableness standard, and they manipu-
lated precedent to justify their results.
1. The Goldman Court Failed to Justify Its Standard of Review
Several flaws exist in the Goldman Court's rationale for choosing
a standard of scrutiny that defers almost completely to military au-
thorities' professional judgment. The majority relied on several of
the Court's previous constitutional rights cases arising in a military
context, 137 but provided no justification for treating free exercise in
a similar fashion. Of the cases the Court cited, the freedom of ex-
pression cases are most analogous to free exercise cases because
each involved a substantive right to freedom from state restrictions
on actions based on beliefs. However, the Court failed to adopt
completely the standard it applied in military free expression cases.
Finally, the imprecise standard that the Court chose effectively pre-
vents meaningful judicial review because it defers so broadly to mili-
tary officials.
Although the .Goldman majority may have stated correctly that
the "military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the
extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First
Amendment,"' 138 courts should not treat free exercise like free
speech for two reasons. First, the right to free exercise is more
nearly absolute than the right to communicate. Regulations that in-
hibit free exercise of religion attack the very essence of individual
autonomy by forcing one to choose between community-based obli-
gations and conscience-based religious duties. The right of free ex-
ercise means more than simply freedom to believe; it also means
freedom to act as those beliefs dictate.' 3 9 Regulations on speech
also attack individual autonomy, but they do not force a choice be-
137 In addition to expression cases, the Court cited cases involving sex discrimina-
tion, criminal rights, and loyalty oaths. See supra note 88.
138 Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986).
139 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). According to one commenta-
tor, "Yoder ... is primarily about actions, and only secondarily about belief." Lupu,
Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739,
772 (1986). "As a matter of free exercise protection, the 'belief-versus-action' distinc-
tion never made sense in the first place .... [R]egulatory coercion is always targeted at
action, and the free exercise clause would be drained of meaning if it did not protect
action in some fashion." Id. at 772 n.155.
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tween conflicting sovereigns. The state often channels expression
by imposing time, place, and manner restrictions on speech without
undermining individuals' right to freely communicate. 140 However,
authorities cannot channel free exercise into a particular forum or a
particular time. 141 Consequently, the Constitution protects reli-
gion-based action to a greater extent than action based on other
motives.142
In addition, free exercise in the military poses fewer potential
dangers than does unrestricted free speech. The military enforces
regulations restricting free speech not only for enforcement's sake,
but also to maintain discipline. 43 Although freedom of speech is an
individual right, 144 it has value only when speech reaches its hear-
ers.145 It is precisely this value that can directly conflict with the
military's need to maintain discipline. 146 In contrast, the right to
free exercise involves only the believer and can exist in isolation. 147
The military "has no concrete interest [in enforcing restrictions on
free exercise] separate from the effect of strict enforcement.
140 See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977)
("laws regulating the time, place, or manner of speech stand on a different footing from
laws prohibiting speech altogether").
141 "[Ilt is simply irrelevant in a case such as Goldman that the claimant can wear his
yarmulke elsewhere. It is the command to remove the skullcap 'here and now' from
which he sought relief." Lupu, supra note 139, at 778.
142 Professor Garvey noted that legal scholars have not enunciated the values under-
lying the right to free exercise. He suggested avoidance of special suffering, conflicting
duties, and social costs accompanying nullification and civil disobedience as possible
theories underlying this right. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18
CONN. L. REV. 779, 792 (1986). These values all presuppose that religion is different
from other beliefs. Garvey argued that, like insanity, religion is special in two ways: "the
first is a cognitive aspect, which concerns defects in practical reasoning; the second is a
volitional aspect, which concerns the ability to conform one's conduct to legal norms
one knows to be binding." Id. at 798.
143 "Since a commander is charged with maintaining morale, discipline, and readi-
ness, he must have authority over the distribution of materials that could affect adversely
these essential attributes of an effective military force." Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348,
356 (1980).
144 One commentator suggested that speech has a self-fulfillment function. M. NiM-
MER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.03 (1984). However, the self-fulfillment func-
tion has never served as a basis for first amendment protection. Powe, Mass Speech and
the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 243, 255 ("the Court had never held that
individual autonomy was the sine qua non of First Amendment [freedom of expression]
jurisprudence").
145 Professor Nimmer referred to the communicative value of speech as its "enlight-
enment function." M. NIMMER, supra note 144, at § 1.02. The Supreme Court protects
speech that serves an enlightenment function in the marketplace of ideas. Baker, Scope of
the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 967 (1978); see, e.g., Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) ("the basis of the First Amendment is the hy-
pothesis that.., free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies").
146 See M. NIMMER, supra note 144, at § 4.06(b).
147 See Lupu, supra note 139, at 778.
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itself."1 48
The unrestricted exercise of an individual's religion might
interfere with military concerns either by undermining uniformity
(and consequently discipline)' 49 or by posing a danger to safety.150
However, strict scrutiny can account for these concerns if they are
compelling and the resulting restrictions preserve to the fullest ex-
tent possible the individual's free exercise rights. Therefore, the
Goldman Court should not have adopted a lesser standard.
The Goldman majority also failed to reconcile its minimal scru-
tiny standard with Brown v. Glines, 151 a military free speech case in
which the Court applied heightened scrutiny. There the Court up-
held a challenged regulation because it was "no more than is rea-
sonably necessary to protect [a] substantial governmental
interest."'152 The Glines standard requires a court to make a factual
inquiry into the reasonableness of a restriction and the substantiality
of an interest whereas the Goldman test calls for virtually complete
deference.153 Because the right to free exercise is more nearly abso-
lute than the right to free speech and is potentially less harmful to
military interests, the Court should have at least provided free exer-
cise the intermediate degree of protection it afforded free speech in
Glines.
Furthermore, the Goldman standard lacks clarity. Although the
majority's opinion indicates that the Court applied a rational basis
test, 154 its language does not necessarily deem unconstitutional a
regulation bearing no rational relation to a legitimate military inter-
est. The majority's standard gives great deference to military offi-
cials, stopping its inquiry as soon as the military proffers an
interest. 155 Virtually any regulation bears a reasonable relation to
some interest. Consequently, no conceivable military regulation af-
fecting free exercise will fail to pass constitutional muster under
Goldman because a court inquires not whether the restriction has a
rational relation to a legitimate interest, but only whether it bears a
rational relation to some perceived interest.
148 Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd sub
nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
149 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986).
150 See Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) ("Navy's interest
in safety was sufficient to meet the compelling need requirement"), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
919 (1980).
151 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
152 Id. at 355.
153 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
154 Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1313-14 (1986).
155 "The desirability of dress regulations in the military is decided by the appropri-
ate military officials and they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their pro-
fessional judgment." Id. at 1314; see supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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2. The Roy Minority Mischaracterized Precedent
The Roy minority misrepresented and mischaracterized prece-
dent. The facts of Roy are indistinguishable from those of core free
exercise cases where the Supreme Court had previously examined
free exercise challenges to neutral restrictions on government bene-
fits with strict scrutiny. Writing for a minority of three, ChiefJustice
Burger explained that the restriction at issue applied uniformly to
all benefit recipients and involved no compulsion because a recipi-
ent could choose to forego the benefit. 156 However, the facially
neutral state action that the claimant in Sherbert v. Verner 157 chal-
lenged forced her "to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting [unemployment] benefits, on the one hand,
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to ac-
cept work, on the other hand." 158 "Governmental imposition of
such a choice," the Sherbert Court held, "puts the same kind of bur-
den upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship." 159 Moreover, the Court
in Thomas v. Review Board 160 held:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behav-
ior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. 161
The DPW forced the Roys to choose between accepting important
welfare benefits and adhering to their religious beliefs. 162 As in Sher-
bert and Thomas, the benefit restriction was facially neutral and did
not "force" compliance, but failure to conform meant the forfeiture
of necessary financial assistance. Thus, the regulation had a "coer-
cive impact"'163 on the Roys.
Chief Justice Burger's attempt to distinguish Roy from these
cases leads only to an inquiry into legislative and administrative mo-
tive. Both Sherbert and Thomas involved statutory schemes with
"good cause" exemptions. 164 Chief Justice Burger explained that
once a state creates an individualized exemption mechanism, its re-
fusal to permit a religious excuse indicates discriminatory intent. 165
156 Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2155 (1986).
157 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
158 Id. at 404.
159 Id.
160 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
161 Id. at 717-18.
162 See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
163 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717.
164 See supra notes 12 & 26 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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However, the good cause exemption provisions themselves were
facially neutral. The legislators who drafted those exemptions no
more intended to discriminate on religious grounds than Congress
did when it enacted the social security number requirement. In ad-
dition, there was no indication of discriminatory administrative mo-
tive in Sherbert or Thomas. In all three cases, the regulations, as
applied, significantly interfered with the plaintiffs' religious beliefs.
It is disingenuous to claim that only the Sherbert and Thomas situa-
tions "exhibit[ed] hostility, not neutrality towards religion."1 66 Con-
sequently, ChiefJustice Burger's approach conflicts with Sherbert and
Thomas. 167
3. The Shabazz Court Applied Flawed Logic
The Supreme Court wrongly carved out prisons as another area
in which professional judgment can override fundamental rights.
Shabazz is a compelling case, for the restricted activity was free exer-
cise in its purest form: worship. t68 The Court did not carefully ex-
amine the state's proffered interests; rather, it implicitly erected a
presumption that those interests were compelling. Consequently,
the state's legitimate interest in prohibiting those prisoners on
outside work details from returning to the prison before the end of
each day sufficed to bar Muslim inmates from attending a service
central to their religion.
In determining the reasonableness of the prison regulations,
the Court applied the Turner factors. t 69 But in doing so, the Court
twisted logic to reach its conclusion. It argued that Muslim prisoners
unable to attend the Friday afternoon Jumu'ah service have alterna-
tive means of exercising their religious rights. 170 It reasoned that
because prison authorities permitted Muslim prisoners to carry out
some of their religious obligations, no constitutional need existed
requiring prison authorities to permit the prisoners to attend their
central worship service as well.' 7 ' The Court reached this conclu-
sion by illogically analogizing free exercise to freedom of expres-
sion. The analogy fails, however, because specific religious duties,
unlike other forms of expression, must occur in a particular time,
166 Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2156 (1986).
167 Note too that, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in her separate Roy opinion, the
Chief Justice improperly relied on Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S.
245 (1934), because the Court decided Hamilton before it had applied the free exercise
clause to the actions of states. Roy, 106 S. Ct. at 2168 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see supra note 1. Hamilton involved no free exercise clause analy-
sis and therefore provides little support for Part III of the Court's Roy opinion.
168 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2402 (1987).
169 Id. at 2405; see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
170 107 S. Ct. at 2406; see supra notes 131 & 134 and accompanying text.
'7' Id.
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place, and manner.1 72 The Court's argument is tantamount to an
argument that the state can prohibit Christian prisoners from cele-
brating Easter because they can celebrate Christmas.
B. The "Core"-"Periphery" Dichotomy is Undesirable
Courts should examine all state action inhibiting an individual's
right to free exercise with strict judicial scrutiny. 173 The context in
which a free exercise claim arises naturally has a tremendous impact
on its resolution, but that context should not wholly determine the
result. The existence of different standards of review creates the
potential for a gradual erosion of free exercise rights. Furthermore,
a strict-scrutiny standard can adequately resolve all free exercise
cases.
1. The Dangers of the "Core "- "Periphery" Dichotomy
Given the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in Goldman,
Roy, and Shabazz, a court can permit government regulation of free
exercise with little factual analysis by implicitly categorizing a given
regulation as arising in the periphery. The traditional strict-scrutiny
standard, unlike the reasonableness standard, forces a court to delve
into the facts of a given case. Such careful inquiry ensures that indi-
viduals' free exercise rights will receive adequate consideration
while it affords the government ample opportunity to show a com-
pelling interest and that it narrowly tailored its regulation to that
end. The implicit core-periphery dichotomy permits courts to side-
step such a factual inquiry.
If courts can adopt dramatically different standards of review
depending upon whether a case falls into the core or the periphery,
the opportunity arises to manipulate a particular set of facts in order
to adopt one standard rather than another. A judge in favor of a
particular restriction on free exercise could analogize the case to
Goldman, Roy, and Shabazz and employ a deferential standard of re-
view. For example, consider how a judge might approach Menora v.
172 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
173 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The Court's test has taken a variety of
forms.
One can, however, glean at least two consistent themes from [the]
Court's precedents. First, when the government attempts to deny a Free
Exercise claim, it must show that an unusually important interest is at
stake, whether that interest is denominated "compelling," "of the highest
order," or "overriding." Second, the government must show that grant-
ing the requested exemption will do substantial harm to the interest,
whether by showing that the means adopted is the "least restrictive" or
"essential," or that the interest will not "otherwise be served."
Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1325 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Illinois High School Association 174 under the emerging doctrine. The
Illinois High School Association (IHSA) oversaw all interscholastic
high school sports in Illinois. It promulgated a rule forbidding bas-
ketball players to wear hats or other headwear. The IHSA inter-
preted its rule to prohibit the players from wearing yarmulkes
during games. Two Orthodox Jewish high schools and their players
filed suit charging that the rule violated their right to free
exercise.' 75
A judge might find that the IHSA has a strong interest in regu-
lating play in the unique context of interscholastic athletics (a con-
text similar to that of public schools 176) and therefore classify the
case as arising beyond the political community. Under Goldman and
Shabazz, the judge could simply defer to the professional expertise
of IHSA officials and permit the restriction.' 77 She might also char-
acterize the basketball players as benefit recipients and the regula-
tions as neutral, justifying minimal scrutiny under the Roy minority
analysis.' 78 Alternatively, she could simply apply strict scrutiny by
forcing the IHSA to demonstrate a compelling interest and that its
regulation was the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.
Only through the latter course would the judge fully examine the
merits of the case. Under the emerging law, any of these ap-
proaches would be permissible.
If the Supreme Court openly recognized such a choice between
standards, it would significantly dilute free exercise rights. Close
judicial scrutiny would become an option rather than a mandatory
safeguard of an important constitutional right. Moreover, if the
views expressed in ChiefJustice Burger's Roy minority opinion ever
become the majority view, the periphery might swallow the core.
174 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); see O'Neil, supra
note 2, at 40-41. In Menora, Judge Posner compared the Sherbert-Thomas balancing test
with that set forth in Yoder. Using a scale as a metaphor, he noted, "Sherbert indicates
that our thumb should be on the claimant's pan, because it says that the state's interest
must be 'compelling' to outweigh the claimant's." Menora, 683 F.2d at 1033. He contin-
ued, "Yoder, however, suggests that a secular regulation is permissible unless it 'unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion." Id. Ultimately, however, the Menora court did not
burden itself with tests, explaining that no real conflict existed between the parties:
If the Talmud required basketball players to wear yarmulkes attached
by bobby pins, there would be a conflict with the state's interest in safety.
But it does not, so it would seem that all the plaintiffs have to do to obvi-
ate the state's concern with safety is to devise a method of affixing a head
covering which will prevent it from falling off during basketball play.
Id. at 1034.
175 Menora, 683 F.2d at 1031-32.
176 See Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986) (free speech case
in which Court noted that "constitutional rights of students in public schools are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings").
177 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
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Part III of the Roy opinion brings the periphery into the core by
treating some claims arising in the political community with great
deference. 179 The more that courts apply a deferential periphery
analysis to cases arising in ordinary contexts, the smaller the core
becomes.
One court has read Part III of the Roy opinion as law. In Leahy v.
District of Columbia,I80 a federal district court applied the minority's
test for challenges of neutral benefit restrictions' 8 1 to a challenge of
the District of Columbia's requirement that driver's license appli-
cants supply their social security numbers. The plaintiff opposed
providing his number for use outside of the social security system
on religious grounds. The court found his religious belief to be le-
gitimate but nonetheless held that "the defendant has met its re-
quired burden since it has demonstrated that its challenged
requirement . . . is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public
interest." 182
2. Strict Scrutiny Protects State Needs in the Periphery
The religious rights of persons in societies apart and those re-
ceiving government benefits are no less important than the rights of
persons in civilian life. Although the state often has greater inter-
ests in limiting free exercise outside the political community than it
does within it,183 the strict scrutiny standard applicable in core 184
free exercise cases can accommodate those interests. When courts
apply reduced scrutiny in the periphery, 8 5 they lessen the impor-
tance of a claimant's rights rather than simply account for a height-
ened government interest.
The Goldman Court implicitly created an almost irrebuttable
presumption that the government has a compelling interest in re-
stricting free exercise in the armed services. If, under a strict scru-
tiny analysis, the Air Force had a compelling interest in enforcing its
dress regulations, Goldman's challenge would have failed.' 86 As
179 See Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2156 (1986) (Burger, CJ., joined by Rehn-
quist and Powell, JJ.).
180 646 F. Supp. 1372 (D.D.C. 1986).
181 See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
182 Leahy, 646 F. Supp. at 1378 (emphasis added).
183 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
186 In Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
919 (1980), the Ninth Circuit upheld a dress regulation under a strict scrutiny analysis
on the ground that the plaintiff's departure from the regulation jeopardized the Navy's
interest in safety. However, absent safety concerns, it is difficult to imagine that a court
would uphold a dress regulation infringing upon religious liberty under a strict scrutiny
analysis. See Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 530 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1981) (injunc-
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Justice O'Connor stated in her Goldman dissent, "[T]he test that one
can glean from the Court's decisions in the civilian context is suffi-
ciently flexible to take into account the special importance of de-
fending our Nation without abandoning completely the freedoms
that make it worth defending."' 8 7
In the prison context, strict judicial scrutiny could both accom-
modate the government's unique interests and safeguard inmates'
free exercise rights. Courts should consider prison authorities'
compelling interests in maintaining order within their institutions.
However, courts belittle prisoners' free exercise rights by allowing
virtually any reasonable state interest to supplant them.
Similarly, the standard of scrutiny that ChiefJustice Burger pro-
posed in Roy for neutral restrictions on government benefits' 88 is
unnecessary. If the government's needs actually mandated using
the Roy claimant's social security number and no less restrictive
means were available to the state, then the regulation would have
survived strict scrutiny. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the compelling
interest test "forces us to measure the importance of a regulation by
ascertaining the marginal benefit of applying it to all individuals,
rather than to all individuals except those holding a conflicting re-
ligious conviction."' 8 9 If no compelling state interest existed, or if
other means of accomplishing it were available, the public benefits
recipient would not be compelled to violate his or her religious
beliefs.
CONCLUSION
The Goldman and Shabazz Courts and the Roy minority employed
an implicit dichotomy to justify minimal scrutiny of free exercise
claims. Their opinions indicate the Court's willingness to divide
free exercise doctrine into "core" and "periphery"; however, the
dichotomy is unnecessary. Goldman, Shabazz, and Part III of Roy ap-
ply the most deferential standard possible simply because the regu-
latory schemes at issue involved unique state interests. However, if
the special government needs in these contexts reached the level of
tion granted under strict scrutiny siandard), vacated, 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(incorrect standard applied below), aff'd sub nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct.
1310 (1986).
187 Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1325 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting); see O'Neil, supra note 2, at
44-45. Justice Brennan noted that he continued "to believe that Government restraint
on First Amendment rights, including limitations placed on military personnel, may be
justified only upon showing a compelling state interest which is precisely furthered by a
narrowly tailored regulation." 106 S. Ct. at 1317-18 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
188 Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2156 (1986) (Burger, CJ.,joined by Rehnquist
and Powell, JJ.).
189 Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1984).
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a compelling interest, then the regulations would have passed mus-
ter under the core analysis. By abandoning the compelling interest
test and turning instead to what is essentially a rational basis stan-
dard, the Goldman and Shabazz Courts and the Roy minority failed to
safeguard adequately the right to free exercise.
MarcJ. Bloostein

